Russian irredentism refers to irredentist claims to parts of the former Russian Empire and the former Soviet Union made for Russia. It seeks to unify Russians outside of Russian borders into the Russian state.
The annexation of Crimea is an example of an irredentist claim. Russian irredentists claim many lands outside of Russia such as Russian-majority regions in the Baltic states, the Russian-majority regions in north Kazakhstan and east Ukraine.
History
Russian Empire
From roughly the 16th century to the 20th century, the Russian Empire followed an expansionist policy. Few of these actions had irredentist justifications, though the conquest of parts of the Ottoman Empire in the Caucasus to bring Armenian Christians under the protection of the Tsar may represent one example.
Post–Soviet Union
Orthographic projection of Greater Russia and near abroad:
The Soviet Union in 1945
Soviet territories that were never part of the Russian Empire: Tuva, Eastern Prussia, Zakarpattia, Western Ukraine and southern Kurils
Additional annexed/occupied territory from the Russian Empire: Finland and Poland
Maximum extent of the Soviet near abroad, 1955: Warsaw Pact, Mongolia and North Korea
Maximum extent of the Russian Empire’s sphere of influence after the sale of Alaska in 1867, despite later Soviet attempts to restore them (Northern Iran, Xinjiang, Manchuria)
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, it was thought that the Russian Federation had given up on plans of territorial expansion or kin-state nationalism, despite some 25 million ethnic Russians living in neighboring countries outside Russia. Stephen M. Saideman and R. William Ayres assert that Russia followed a non-irredentist policy in the 1990s despite some justifications for irredentist policies—one factor disfavoring irredentism was a focus by the ruling interest in consolidating power and the economy within the territory of Russia. Furthermore, a stable policy of irredentism popular with the electorate was not found, and politicians proposing such ideas did not fare well electorally. Russian nationalist politicians tended to focus on internal threats (i.e. “outsiders”) rather than on the interests of Russians outside the federation.
It has been proposed that the annexation of Crimea in 2014 proves Russia’s adherence to irredentism today. After the event in Crimea, the Transnistrian authorities requested Russia to annex Transnistria.
The annexation of Crimea led to a new wave of Russian nationalism, with large parts of the Russian far right movement aspiring to annex even more land from Ukraine, including the unrecognized Novorossiya. Vladimir Socor proposed that Russian president Vladimir Putin’s speech after the annexation of Crimea was a de facto “manifesto of Greater-Russia Irredentism”. After international sanctions were imposed against Russia in early 2014, within a year the “Novorossiya” project was suspended: on 1 January 2015, the founding leadership announced the project has been put on hold, and on 20 May the constituent members announced the freezing of the political project. On 21 February 2022, Putin recognised the independence of pro-Russian separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk, as well as their irredentist claims to the Donbas region of Ukraine, and sent Russian troops into Ukraine. On 24 February 2022, Russia formally invaded Ukraine.
Some Russian nationalists seek to annex parts of the “near abroad”, such as the Baltic states, while some fear potential escalation due to Russian irredentist aspirations in northern Kazakhstan also.